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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 860201-CA 
v. : 
WILLIAM SILAS CASE, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
STATEMENT QF JSSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The following issues are presented in the Statefs 
petition for rehearing: 
1. Did the Court incorrectly conclude that the trial 
court erroneously admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of 
the State's chief witness at trial? 
2. Assuming that the trial court properly admitted the 
preliminary hearing testimony, should the Court have affirmed 
defendant's conviction notwithstanding the trial court's failure 
to suppress certain evidence? 
STATEMENT QF TAP CASE 
Defendant, William Silas Case, was charged with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN, § 
76-5-103 (1978) (R. 5). After a jury trial, he was found guilty 
of that offense (R. 42). The court sentenced him to a term of 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 43). 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
The State agrees with most of the fact statement set 
forth in the Court's opinion in State v. Case, P.2d , Ut. 
Ct. App. No. 860201-CA, slip op. at 1-2 (filed April 15, 1987) (a 
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copy of the entire opinion is attached as Appendix A). However, 
the Court's statement that the cassette of Suzzanne McPerrson's 
preliminary hearing testimony was "likely taken into the jury 
room during deliberation and may have been played there as well 
as during the trial," slip op. at 2, is not supported by the 
record on appeal. Speculation about whether the cassette was 
either taken into the jury room or replayed there should have no 
bearing on the Court's decision. See State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 
43, 46 (Utah 1984) (the Court cannot rule on matters outside the 
trial court record); State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah 
1983) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In holding that the trial court erred in admitting the 
preliminary hearing testimony of the State's chief witness at 
trial, this Court misapplied or overlooked controlling authority 
from the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. 
The Court's conclusion that the admission of the preliminary 
hearing testimony occurred without the State establishing the 
witness's unavailability and in violation of defendant's right of 
confrontation is contrary to established law. 
Because the Court did not apply controlling authority 
to the question of admitting the preliminary hearing testimony, 
it analyzed the suppression of evidence issue in terms of the 
case being remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
However, if controlling authority is applied to the former 
question, a new trial is not warranted, and the suppression issue 
should be disposed of in the manner argued for in the brief filed 
by the State in response to defendant's opening brief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is submitted pursuant to 
Utah R. ct. App. 35. in Brown v. Packard* denying reh'qr 4 Utah 
292, 11 P. 512 (1886) , the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
standard for determining whether a petition for rehearing should 
be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In Cumminqs v. 
Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Supreme Court 
stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it 
is meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT A PROSECUTION 
WITNESS'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY WAS 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL WITHOUT THE NECESSARY 
FINDING OF UNAVAILABILITY AND IN VIOLATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS 
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW. 
In the lower court, the State presented the following 
evidence of its efforts to secure the attendance of defendant's 
victim, Suzzanne McPerrson, at trial. Sherry Brown, a legal 
secretary with the Tooele County Attorney's uffice, personally 
served a subpoena on McPerrson for the preliminary hearing while 
r*cPerrson was in a local hospital shortly after the crime. After 
McPerrson had testified at the preliminary hearing, Brown 
verbally informed her of a tentative trial date, with the 
understanding that McPerrson would shortly thereafter give the 
county attorney's office an address to which a "reminder" 
subpoena could be sent. Subsequently, McPerrson contacted the 
county attorney, and a subpoena was sent to her in Mobile, 
Alabama. McPerrson acknowledged receipt of the subpoena four 
days after it was sent in a telephone conversation with Brown. 
During that conversation, Brown reviewed the date and location of 
the trial with McPerrson and received assurances from her that 
she would attend. In the following weeks before trial, Brown 
talked with ..cPerrson approximately eight times about the trial, 
each time receiving a commitment from McPerrson that she would 
attend voluntarily. It was not until the morning of trial that 
Brown learned from a police officer that McPerrson would not be 
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appearing. The officer had received a long distance phone call 
from McPerrson that morning, in which McPerrson indicated that 
she would not be at trial because "she was afraid of the 
defendant in the matter and . . • couldn't bring herself to come 
in" (T. 14-19, 21-24). Finally, the prosecutor did not utilize 
the "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from 
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings" (hereinafter "Uniform 
Act"), found in UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-21-1 sX £££*• (1982) (T. 3). 
The Court acknowledges the efforts of the prosecutor, 
and even characterizes them as "thorough and in good faith." 
Case, slip op. at 3. Nevertheless, it reverses defendant's 
conviction because (1) the prosecutor, by not utilizing the 
Uniform Act, failed to demonstrate McPerrsonfs unavailability, 
and (2) "[tlhe use of an audio tape of prior testimony without 
corroboration deprived defendant of his right of confrontation 
under the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I 
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution." !&• at 3, 4. With 
all due respect to the Court, this two-pronged holding appears to 
be contrary to controlling authority from the Utah Supreme Court 
and the United States Supreme Court. 
In State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly set forth the law applicable to the 
admission of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony at trial: 
Defendant's right to confrontation is 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Article 
I, Section 12, and by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
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In the context of federal constitutional 
lawf the court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), 
(hereinafter Roberts) outlined a two-pronged 
test to determine the admission of prior 
testimony in relationship to confrontation 
considerations. The first requirement is 
that the witness must be unavailable; the 
second requirement is that the testimony must 
bear sufficient indicia of reliability to 
permit its introduction at trial. Mancusi v. 
£tUll£L£r 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 38 
L.Ed.2d 293 (1972)? Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 
74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 
20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968); Pointer v. Texas. 380 
U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 
(1965); Mattox v. United States. 156 U.S. 
237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). See 
AiSfi State v. Mannion. 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542 
(1899) . 
A state may construe its own 
constitution more narrowly than the federal 
constitution even though the provisions 
involved may be similar. Nonetheless, the 
two-pronged test in Roberts appears to be a 
correct and reasonable standard to this 
Court. 
in state Vt PnisKorr 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 
P.2d 929 (1973), we held that the testimony 
of an unavailable witness given at the 
preliminary hearing could be used at trial 
provided prosecutorial authorities have made 
a good faith effort to obtain his presence at 
trial. The rule of review enunciated in 
Gallegos v. Turner* Utah, 526 P.2d 1128 
(1974), is that we will not reverse the 
ruling of the trial judge that the efforts 
were made in good faith in the absence of a 
showing of clear abuse of discretion. 
638 P.2d at 539. These standards apply regardless of whether the 
analysis proceeds under the state and federal constitutions or 
under Utah R. Evid. 804. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541-42 (holding 
that constitutional analysis applied equally under former Utah R. 
Evid. 63(3), a rule comparable to current Rule 804(b)(1)). See 
generally 4 J. Weinstein 6 Berger, WeinStein'S Evidence 
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S 804(a) 111 at 47-56 (1985) (summarizing federal case law 
defining unavailability under Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5)).1 
In holding that "the prosecutor did not make use of the 
•reasonable means1 required to meet the definition of 
•unavailability,•" Case, slip op. at 4, this Court neither states 
nor applies the applicable standard of review, and makes no 
effort to distinguish this case from state v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 
1119 (Utah 1982)f which appears to require a result different 
from that reached here. Under Brooks, the trial courtfs 
determination of unavailability will not be reversed absent "a 
showing of clear abuse of discretion." 638 P.2d at 539 (emphasis 
added). When that standard is applied in conjunction with the 
holding of Chapman, it is difficult to find any abuse of 
discretion in defendant's case, let alone a clear abuse of 
discretion. In Chapman, the Supreme Court, indicating that there 
was no inflexible requirement that the Uniform Act be utilized as 
a condition precedent to the use of prior testimony, held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that an 
out-of-state witness was unavailable and that his preliminary 
hearing testimony was admissible when the witness had 
acknowledged receipt of a subpoena in the mail and the prosecutor 
had no reason to question his availability prior to seven days 
before 
* The Utah Supreme Court has never construed Utah K. Evid. 
804(a)(5); however, it has made clear that, in accordance with 
the intent of the advisory committee for Utah's new rules of 
evidence, it will "lookl] to the interpretations of the federal 
rules by the federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah 
rules." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) 
(citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986)). 
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trial* Specifically, the Court stated: 
We find that the trial court did not err 
in determining that the second witness, 
Richard Scoville, was "unavailable." Upon 
receipt of the Utah subpoena, Scoville 
affixed his signature to the line which 
acknowledged his receipt of the subpoena and 
his intention to comply with it. When 
Scoville first contacted the county attorney 
on February 26 he said he would attend the 
trial. Because of these responses, the state 
had no reason to question Scoville's 
availability prior to seven days before 
trial. After learning late on February 26 
that Scoville would not attend and failing in 
their attempts to contact Scoville's employer 
on February 26 the state had only five days 
to implement the Uniform Act. while it is 
possible to imagine more concerted efforts by 
the state to secure voluntary compliance, we 
hold on these facts that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the 
state acted in good faith in attempting to 
secure Scoville's attendance at trial. 
655 P.2d at 1123-24. In comparison, the State's efforts in 
defendants case were far more concerted than those at issue in 
Chapman. and the prosecutor had no reason to believe that 
McPerrson would not appear until the day of trial, rather than 
the five days1 notice received in Chapman. Although this wourt 
states that it "believels] the permissive use of the Uniform Act 
should continue to be the norm in Utah," Case, slip op. at 3, its 
conclusion that McPerrson was not unavailable because the 
prosecutor did not, with extremely short notice, implement the 
Uniform Act effectively guts the holding of Chapman in favor of a 
most inflexible rule which requires use of the Uniform Act in 
nearly all cases. ££. State v. Gray. 616 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. App. 
1981) (cited in Chapman. 655 P.2d at 1123, as authority contrary 
to the rule adopted by the Utah Supreme Court). 
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The Court avoids the Chapman holding cited above by 
alluding to the following language in that case: 
Whenf howeverf the state receives a clear 
message that the witness is aware of the 
noncorapulsory effect of the subpoena and that 
the witness intends not to comply, for 
whatever reason, the state must either take 
additional steps to secure voluntary 
compliance, with appropriate assurances, or 
resort to the more compulsory avenues offered 
by the Uniform Act. Half-hearted last minute 
efforts, as here, to confirm a witness* 
intention not to comply are insufficient to 
demonstrate good faith and override the 
defendant's constitutional rights of 
confrontation at trial. 
655 P.2d at 1123. The Court concludes that the prosecutor had "a 
clear message" that McPerrson would not appear because of her 
"lifestyle and nomadic habits," "the distance the victim would 
have to travel to appear," and "[h]er financial condition [which] 
evidenced a distinct lack of funds with which to travel." Case* 
slip op. at 3. It is not at all clear upon what record evidence 
the Court bases these conclusions. The State is unable to find 
anything in the record to indicate that either finances or 
distance of travel were an obvious impedement to McPerrson's 
appearance at trial, or that the prosecutor should have known 
that they were.^ Furthermore, the only basis in the record for 
concluding that McPerrson had "nomadic habits" is defendant's 
testimony that she had indicated to him some difficulties with 
other truckers from whom she had received rides and defense 
^ Defendant has not argued this on appeal, and he did not do so 
at trial. Moreover, normally the prosecutor's office pays for 
the travel and lodging of an out-of-state witness. Indeed, $ 77-
21-3 requires that the witness be paid for travel and time 
expended. 
-9-
counsel's statement prior to trial that the prosecution knew at 
the time of preliminary hearing that McPerrson had not had a 
permanent address for over eight years (T. 3-4, 147-49)• First, 
counsel's unsubstantiated statement concerning McPerrson's lack 
of a permanent address should not be evidence upon which a 
factual conclusion rests. £L££L State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 
P.2d 285, 313 (1941) (remarks by counsel during opening statement 
to the jury are not evidence). Second, to the extent that it may 
be inferred from defendant's testimony that McPerrson was 
hitchhiking with truckers as she traveled around the country, 
££££.# slip op. at 2, it cannot fairly be assumed from this 
limited evidence that McPerrson was a "career" hitchhiker or had 
such nomadic tendencies that she could not reasonably be trusted 
to appear voluntarily at trial. The extent or purpose of her 
travel was never established in the record below. In sum, the 
Court appears to have arrived at conclusions of fact based on 
speculation about matters outside the trial court record— 
something the Supreme Court has indicated an appellate court 
should not do. Bingham, 684 P.2d at 46; Sparks, 672 P.2d at 94. 
The second prong of the Court's holding, which 
identifies a right of confrontation violation, Case, slip op. at 
3, is perhaps more disturbing. On appeal, defendant raised no 
issue concerning the propriety of using an audio tape of prior 
testimony or alleged undue reliance on the taped testimony by the 
jury because it may have taken the tape into the jury room and 
replayed it. He limited his argument to an attack on the trial 
court's ruling concerning unavailability. Br. of App. at 11-14. 
-10-
It is well established in Utah that an appellate court generally 
will not address issues not presented by a defendant on appeal* 
£££r e.9., State V, ClPUflr 722 P.2d 750, 754 n. 3 (Utah 1986). 
Nevertheless, this Court stated without qualification and with no 
citations to supporting authority: 
The use of an audio tape of prior testimony 
without corroboration deprived defendant of 
his right of confrontation under the 6th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution. There was nothing and no one 
to confront. If this tape was taken into the 
jury room and was played, there is an 
additional erroneous deprivation of the right 
of confrontation and an over reliance on the 
testimony by the jury.3 
£a££.# slip op. at 3. These rather broad statements of law, which 
appear to be a primary basis for the Court's conclusion that the 
prosecutor should have utilized the Uniform Act, are directly 
contrary to State Yt PrOPkS and QhiO V. RpfrertSr 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), which squarely hold that preliminary hearing testimony 
may be admitted at trial for an unavailable witness without 
violating a defendant's right of confrontation under the state 
and federal constitutions. Neither Brooks nor Roberts prohibits 
the admission of an audio tape in lieu of a transcript, or 
J
 Again, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the tape 
was taken into the jury room and played; the Court merely 
speculates that this may have occurred. One cannot discern from 
the record whether the jury even had the equipment necessary to 
play the tape. 
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excludes the prior testimony if uncorroborated,* And, defendant 
does not argue, nor is there any indication in the record, tnat 
the preliminary hearing suffered from any confrontational 
defects. Finally, simply because the prior testimony constituted 
the primary evidence against defendant is of no consequence. 
*hat was the case in both Brooks and Roberts. See also 
California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
In effect, the Court has created a new constitutional 
rule which is diametrically opposed to the one adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Although 
an intermediate court of appeals is certainly free to criticize 
the rulings of the superior appellate court, see, e.g.» Selby v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles. 168 Cal. Rptr. 36, 37-38 (Cal. App. 
1980), in performing the primary "error-correcting" function in a 
two-tiered appellate system, it is not in a position to overrule 
superior authority, and it generally should refrain from 
performing its "law-declaring" function in cases of great moment. 
£££. £LAt£ v. Grawien. 123 Wis.2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818 
(Wis. App. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1986) 
(authorizing certification of issues to Supreme Court)• 
4
 The Court's statement that the victim's testimony was 
uncorroborated appears to be incorrect. First, it is difficult 
to understand how the Court could make such a determination 
without knowing the content of her testimony. (As noted in the 
opinion, her testimony was not transcribed for purposes of 
appeal. Case, slip op. at 2.) Furthermore, assuming that 
McPerrson's testimony established that defendant had assaulted 
her, the testimony of a number of prosecution witnesses about her 
physical condition immediately after the incident, as well as 
evidence of screams heard coming from defendants motel room, 
would constitute corroborative evidence (T. 32-39, 47-53, 58-63, 
102-06). &££ Bi££JlS.# 638 P.2d at 539. 
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Therefore, whether or not the Court decides to reexamine its 
holding concerning the unavailability of McPerrsonf it should 
eliminate these erroneous statements of law concerning the right 
of confrontation* Beyond being contrary to settled precedent, 
those statements are not necessary to the resolution of the only 
issue raised by defendant on appeal — i.e., whether the trial 
court clearly abused its discretion in determining that ^cPerrson 
was unavailable for the purpose of admitting her preliminary 
hearing testimony. 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT APPLIES CONTROLLING AUTHORITY TO 
THE PRIOR TESTIMONY ISSUE, REVERSAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS NOT WARRANTED; 
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S SUPPRESSION ISSUE 
SHOULD BE DISPOSED OF IN THE MANNER ARGUED 
FOR IN THE BRIEF FILED BY THE STATE IN 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF. 
Based upon the arguments presented in Point I, the 
Court's reversal of defendant's conviction on the prior testimony 
appears to be incorrect, therefore, defendant's claim that 
evidence should have been suppressed need not be analyzed as it 
was by the Court. £&££, slip op at 4. If the Court is inclined 
to reexamine its holding on the prior testimony issue, the otate 
respectfully requests that the suppression issue be disposed of 
in the manner argued for in the brief filed by the State in 
response to defendant's opening brief. Br. or Resp. at 6-8 
(attached as Appendix B)• 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it appears that 
the Court in State v. Case either overlooked or misapprehended 
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controlling authority in concluding that the trial court 
erroneously admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of an 
absent prosecution witness* Therefore, the Statefs petition for 
rehearing should be granted, and the Court should either modify 
its opinion and affirm defendant's conviction without further 
argument or restore the case to the calendar for reargument or 
resubmission. Utah R. Ct. App. 35(c). 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
crftrr good faith and not for delay. RESPECTFULLY submitted this _£2JL__T day of April, 
1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Alan K. Jeppesen, 200 North Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84074, this 
__o22522~day of April, 1987. 
^?6a^cJ vA. \3cr>^ 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
.r.v, 
V / . ,-' ,K<. l*S-t-i. 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William Silas Case, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
*67 APT 16 P4:4& 
OPINION 
AT7:r:. • .•.•••:, . 
Case No. 860201-CA 
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Defendant was convicted of the crime of aggravated 
assault, a Felony of the Third Degree, in the District Court 
and was sentenced to confinement in the Utah State Prison for 
the statutory period. Defendant appeals claiming the trial 
court erred in admitting evidence obtained in a warrantless and 
unreasonable search and seizure. He also claims it was error 
to allow the preliminary hearing testimony of the absent victim 
to be used in trial. We reverse and remand. 
William Silas Case, a long haul trucker, was proceeding 
east on Interstate Route 80 during the early morning hours of 
February 6, 1986. Severe weather conditions caused him to exit 
the road at a truck stop in Lakepoint, Tooele County, Utah. 
Case subsequently took a room at the Oquirrh Motor Inn in 
Lakepoint under the name Bill Freeman. 
At approx 
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Four members of the Tooele County Sheriff's Office 
responded to the report. Defendant met the officers on the 
second floor balcony outside of his room. After ascertaining 
that defendant wasn't armed and without asking his permission 
nor obtaining a search warrant, the officers entered his room 
and obtained evidence. 
The trial record indicates the victim had a practice of 
hitchhiking with truckers as she traveled around the country. 
Upon her arrival at the truck stop she contacted defendant by 
CB radio and he gave her shelter in his motel room. Alcoholic 
beverages were purchased and consumed by both victim and 
defendant. After a struggle, the victim ran from defendant's 
room into the managerfs apartment. She subsequently told one 
of the officers that defendant had tried to kill her. 
Defendant claimed the victim was attempting suicide which he 
tried to prevent. 
Ms. McPerrson was personally served a subpoena while in 
the hospital. She appeared and gave testimony at the 
preliminary hearing. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the 
victim was given a tentative trial date by the criminal legal 
secretary for the Tooele County Attorney. The victim left an 
address and telephone number in Mobile, Alabama. She was 
mailed a subpoena at the Mobile, Alabama address which was 
acknowledged by telephone. Between the preliminary hearing and 
the date set for trial, the victim contacted the secretary 
approximately eight times. On each occasion she indicated a 
willingness to voluntarily appear at trial. On the morning of 
the trial, the victim telephoned and stated she would not be 
present. Because of the victim's absence the trial court 
allowed the cassette recording of her preliminary hearing 
testimony to be played before the jury, over the objection of 
defense counsel. The conviction and this appeal ensued. 
The trial record does not contain any information 
concerning the content of the victim's testimony at the 
preliminary hearing other than it was played to the jury. The 
cassette was admitted into evidence, likely taken into the jury 
room during deliberation and may have been played there as well 
as during the trial. 
The crux of this case can be found in Utah R. Evid. 804 
(b)(1), which permits the recorded testimony of an unavailable 
witness to be used if it was given at another hearing of the 
same or different proceeding and if the opposing party had an 
opportunity to develop the testimony through cross 
examination. Rule 804 (a)(5) defines "unavailability- in part 
as the witness being absent and "the proponent of his statement 
has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other 
reasonable means." 
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Although the Tooele County Attorney*s Office personally 
served the victim with a subpoena to insure her attendance at 
the preliminary hearing, that office did not do so for the 
trial. It is not denied that the prosecutor attempted to keep 
close contact with Ms. McPerrson while she was in Alabama 
during the period between the preliminary hearing and the 
trial. A subpoena was sent by mail which was acknowledged by 
the victim. The numerous telephone calls all caused Tooele 
County to believe this critical witness would appear. But, the 
prosecutor's mailing of a subpoena was not effective service. 
At his disposal was the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of 
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-21-1 et seq. (1982). This was not used. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 
1119, 1122 (Utah 1982), stated that use of the Uniform Act is 
permissive. However, that Court also indicated a preference 
for the Uniform Act if the state •receives a clear message" 
that the out-of-state witness wonft comply with the mailed 
subpoena and appropriate assurances to secure voluntary 
compliance might not be effective. Here, the state*s efforts 
to ensure the victim's attendance at the trial would appear to 
be thorough and in good faith. The mailed subpoena and the 
numerous telephone contacts indicate a concern on the part of 
the prosecutor that the witness in fact be present. 
Defendant could only be found guilty through the victim's 
testimony that he stabbed her and that she was not in the 
process of trying to end her life. The right of confrontation 
is most critical in a situation such as this. Two conflicting 
stories are told with little or no corroborative evidence 
available. The jury must decide whom to believe. It is 
vitally important that the witness be present and subject to 
cross examination in the presence of the jury. The use of an 
audio tape of prior testimony without corroboration deprived 
defendant of his right of confrontation under the 6th Amendment 
of the U. S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah 
State Constitution. There was nothing and no one to confront. 
If this tape was taken into the jury room and was played, there 
is an additional erroneous deprivation of the right of 
confrontation and an over reliance on the testimony by the 
jury. While we believe the permissive use of the Uniform Act 
should continue to be the norm in Utah, this is a situation in 
which the prosecution should have used it. Ms. McPerrson's 
lifestyle and nomadic habits make it clear that she possessed 
the potential to disappear or refuse to appear for trial. The 
prosecutor was aware of the distance the victim would have to 
travel to be present. Her financial condition evidenced a 
distinct lack of funds with which to travel. On balance, the 
prosecutor should have been wary of this witness despite her 
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telephone assurances. The use of the Uniform Act would have 
been the proper procedure to apply and# without its use, the 
prosecutor did not make use of the "reasonable means* required 
to meet the definition of "unavailability." 
We need not analyze the second prong of the test which 
determines whether the testimony of an absent witness may be 
admitted. We have already determined the victim was not 
"unavailable", therefore, whether such testimony bore 
sufficient indicia of reliability is not addressed. State v. 
JBXfifllSfi, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). 
Because we remand for a new trial, the issue of the 
propriety of using evidence taken from the motel room is 
examined. The State, in its appellate brief, concedes there is 
some question whether the evidence obtained in the warrantless 
search of defendants room should have been suppressed pursuant 
to Utah R. Criro. P. 12(g). We agree that there were no exigent 
circumstances present that necessitated an entry into the motel 
room without a search warrant. State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 
179 (Utah 1983). The trial record shows Case was on the balcony 
outside of the room when the police arrived. He was unarmed 
and cooperative. In this situation the officers should have 
attempted to get defendants permission to enter,or failing 
that, obtained a search warrant. We hold that the Motion to 
Suppress evidence taken from the motel room should have been 
granted. 
We reverse and remand to the District Court for a new 
trial on the matter. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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APPENDIX B 
witness was "unavailable" and that h i s preliminary hearing 
testimony was admissible when the witness had acknowledged 
rece ipt of a subpoena in the mail and the prosecutor had no 
reason to quest ion h i s a v a i l a b i l i t y prior to seven days before 
t r i a l . Chapman further held that there was no i n f l e x i b l e 
requirement that the Uniform Act be u t i l i z e d as a condition 
precedent to the use of prior testimony. Under Chapman, the 
S ta te made reasonable and good f a i t h e f f o r t s to secure 
McPhearson's attendance at t r i a l . I t had no reason to be l ieve 
that she would not appear unt i l the morning of t r i a l . 
Accordingly, t h i s Court should uphold the lower cour t ' s dec i s ion 
concerning McPhearsonfs preliminary hearing testimony. Defendant 
simply has f a i l e d t o show any abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , l e t alone a 
clear abuse of d i s c r e t i o n — the relevant standard of review. 
Galleqos v. Turner, 526 P.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Utah 1974) . 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SUPPRESS CERTAIN 
EVIDENCE REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION. 
In Point I of h i s brief (Brief of Appellant at 4 - 1 1 ) , 
defendant argues that the t r i a l court committed error when i t 
admitted evidence obtained in a warrantless search of h i s motel 
room by po l i ce o f f i c e r s short ly after McPhearson had run from 
that room. Beyond h i s f a i l u r e to ident i fy s p e c i f i c a l l y the 
evidence he claims was improperly admitted,2 defendant i s g u i l t y 
2 For ins tance , defendant appears t o challenge the a d m i s s i b i l i t y 
of photographs that were taken during the search; however, af ter 
making h i s motion t o suppress at t r i a l , he s t ipu la ted t o the 
admission of those photographs (T. 75) . 
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of an even more bas ic error on appeal: he f a i l s t o present any 
argument that the a l l eged ly erroneous admission of the challenged 
evidence cons t i tu ted r e v e r s i b l e error in l i g h t of a l l the 
evidence presented. I t i s a fundamental rule that the erroneous 
admission of evidence may neverthe less be harmless error. See 
S ta te v. N i c k l e s , 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 24, P.2d , 
(1986) ( c i t ing State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982) ) ; 
Utah R. Evid. 103 (a ) ; Utah R. Crim. P. 3 0 ( a ) . 
Given t h i s Court's dec i s ion in State v. Harrisy 671 
P.2d 175 (Utah 1983) , and the wel l e s tab l i shed pr inc ip l e in Utah 
t h a t , with respect to po l ice searches , a motel room i s afforded 
protect ion s imilar to that given one's home, S ta te v. Folkes f 565 
P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) , c e r t , denied, 434 U.S. 971, the 
S ta te must concede that , under the f a c t s presented, there i s some 
quest ion whether the evidence obtained in the warrantless search 
of defendant's room should have been suppressed under Utah R. 
Crim. P. 1 2 ( g ) , the rule that contro l s such ques t ions . However, 
even if error were assumed in t h i s regard, reversal i s not 
warranted. Defendant has provided the Court with no meaningful 
appe l la te record of Ms. McPhearson's testimony which, i t seems 
obvious from a review of the t r i a l t ranscr ip t , must have been the 
bulk of the S t a t e ' s evidence aga ins t him. Consequently, the 
Court has no means of reviewing the su f f i c i ency of the S t a t e ' s 
evidence absent that which defendant chal lenges or of determining 
whether there l i k e l y would have been a d i f f erent r e s u l t in 
defendant's t r i a l without the a l l eged evident iary error. 
N i c k l e s , 43 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24; Utah R. Evid. 103 (a ) ; Utah R. 
Crim. P. 30 (a ) . 
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Furthermore, defendant is not able to show, by 
reference to the appellate record, that he was prejudiced by the 
alleged erroneous admission of evidence — something that he is 
obliged to do on appeal. Ibid. See also State v. Griffin, 626 
P.2d 478, 483 (Utah 1981) (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) 
(holaing that introduction of fruits of unlawful search and 
seizure was harmless error, in that there was sufficient 
untainted evidence to sustain the defendants' convictions). 
Because defendant has failed to carry the burden of demonstrating 
that reversible error occurred below, Jones, 657 P.2d at 1267 
(due either to an inability to do so or to the absence of an 
adequate record on appeal, s_ee State v. Wulf f enstein, 657 P. 2d 
289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983)), the 
Court should hold that, even if it were assumed the trial court 
erred in admitting the challenged evidence, defendant has not 
presented grounds for reversal of his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convict ion should be affirmed. /_ ,—-
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s <* ' day of December, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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